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Alex Murray and Ubuntu Security Team에서 제공하는 콘텐츠입니다. 에피소드, 그래픽, 팟캐스트 설명을 포함한 모든 팟캐스트 콘텐츠는 Alex Murray and Ubuntu Security Team 또는 해당 팟캐스트 플랫폼 파트너가 직접 업로드하고 제공합니다. 누군가가 귀하의 허락 없이 귀하의 저작물을 사용하고 있다고 생각되는 경우 여기에 설명된 절차를 따르실 수 있습니다 https://ko.player.fm/legal.
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Episode 140

12:39
 
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Manage episode 309005077 series 2423058
Alex Murray and Ubuntu Security Team에서 제공하는 콘텐츠입니다. 에피소드, 그래픽, 팟캐스트 설명을 포함한 모든 팟캐스트 콘텐츠는 Alex Murray and Ubuntu Security Team 또는 해당 팟캐스트 플랫폼 파트너가 직접 업로드하고 제공합니다. 누군가가 귀하의 허락 없이 귀하의 저작물을 사용하고 있다고 생각되는 경우 여기에 설명된 절차를 따르실 수 있습니다 https://ko.player.fm/legal.

Overview

A gnarly old bug in NSS is unearthed, plus we cover security updates for ICU, the Linux kernel and ImageMagick as well.

This week in Ubuntu Security Updates

20 unique CVEs addressed

[USN-5156-1] ICU vulnerability [00:40]

  • 1 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Hirsute (21.04)
  • Double free - originally reported in chromium but is actually in embedded copy of icu - able to be triggered on crafted content to icu, in the case of chromium this could be via a crafted webpage or similar so not too dissimilar to usual web handling issues - memory corruption -> code execution (but within chromium sandbox in that case)

[USN-5158-1] ImageMagick vulnerabilities [01:25]

[USN-5161-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [01:55]

  • 4 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Hirsute (21.04)
  • 5.11 kernel (generic hirsute + clouds, raspi, focal hwe etc)
  • armhf specific issue (Aspeed LPC bus controller) - local user OOB write -> crash / code-exec
  • AMD cryptographic coprocessor driver memory leaks -> DoS (Episode 138)
  • SCTP OOB read - incoming packets

[USN-5162-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [03:13]

[USN-5163-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [03:59]

  • 4 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS)
  • 5.4 (focal, bionic HWE)
  • AMD cryptographic coprocessor driver memory leaks -> DoS (Episode 138)
  • SCTP OOB read - incoming packets
  • USB Option High Speed Mobile driver -> UAF if unplug device before fully registered - local attacker could trigger - crash / code-exec

[USN-5164-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [04:50]

  • 3 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS)
  • 4.15 (bionic, xenial ESM, trusty ESM - azure)
  • AMD cryptographic coprocessor driver memory leaks -> DoS (Episode 138)
  • SCTP OOB read - incoming packets

[USN-5165-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities [05:13]

[USN-5168-1, USN-5168-2, USN-5168-3] NSS and Thunderbird vulnerability [06:08]

  • 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Hirsute (21.04), Impish (21.10)

New NSS vulnerability (CVE-2021-43527) discussion [06:17]

  • Discovered by Tavis Ormandy at GPZ
  • NSS is a very old project, code in question has existed since 2003 and been exploitable since at least 2012 when it was refactored
  • Does a direct memcpy of an attacker controlled amount of data into a fixed size buffer without specifically checking whether the data is too large - classic heap-based buffer overflow
  • Object on the heap also contains function pointer which then get called so relatively easy to get control flow and code execution as a result
  • NSS was one of the first projects added to oss-fuzz (Google), Mozilla do own fuzzing as well, extensive testsuite and uses ASAN for internal builds
  • Uses Coverity but this didn’t detect it either
  • Existing fuzzing and unit tests had test cases which could reach this code but failed to find it for a number of reasons:
    • Fuzz input is limited to 10k - but to overflow need at least 16,384 bytes so fuzzing couldn’t have caught this
    • Individual code paths fuzzed but not so much end-to-end systematic testing - so nothing which would try generating say large inputs in this case - does occur for other code-paths though
    • Existing metrics almalgate results from all fuzzers - so hard to tell how well a piece of code has been fuzzed as it may have been using a fuzzed which may never trigger relevant input to find bugs like this
  • Seemingly well tested, well fuzzed code is not enough - need to look systematically and quantify how complete the coverage is not just in terms of LOC or inputs used, but also boundary conditions etc
  • https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/12/this-shouldnt-have-happened.html

Get in contact

  continue reading

231 에피소드

Artwork

Episode 140

Ubuntu Security Podcast

138 subscribers

published

icon공유
 
Manage episode 309005077 series 2423058
Alex Murray and Ubuntu Security Team에서 제공하는 콘텐츠입니다. 에피소드, 그래픽, 팟캐스트 설명을 포함한 모든 팟캐스트 콘텐츠는 Alex Murray and Ubuntu Security Team 또는 해당 팟캐스트 플랫폼 파트너가 직접 업로드하고 제공합니다. 누군가가 귀하의 허락 없이 귀하의 저작물을 사용하고 있다고 생각되는 경우 여기에 설명된 절차를 따르실 수 있습니다 https://ko.player.fm/legal.

Overview

A gnarly old bug in NSS is unearthed, plus we cover security updates for ICU, the Linux kernel and ImageMagick as well.

This week in Ubuntu Security Updates

20 unique CVEs addressed

[USN-5156-1] ICU vulnerability [00:40]

  • 1 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Hirsute (21.04)
  • Double free - originally reported in chromium but is actually in embedded copy of icu - able to be triggered on crafted content to icu, in the case of chromium this could be via a crafted webpage or similar so not too dissimilar to usual web handling issues - memory corruption -> code execution (but within chromium sandbox in that case)

[USN-5158-1] ImageMagick vulnerabilities [01:25]

[USN-5161-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [01:55]

  • 4 CVEs addressed in Focal (20.04 LTS), Hirsute (21.04)
  • 5.11 kernel (generic hirsute + clouds, raspi, focal hwe etc)
  • armhf specific issue (Aspeed LPC bus controller) - local user OOB write -> crash / code-exec
  • AMD cryptographic coprocessor driver memory leaks -> DoS (Episode 138)
  • SCTP OOB read - incoming packets

[USN-5162-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [03:13]

[USN-5163-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [03:59]

  • 4 CVEs addressed in Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS)
  • 5.4 (focal, bionic HWE)
  • AMD cryptographic coprocessor driver memory leaks -> DoS (Episode 138)
  • SCTP OOB read - incoming packets
  • USB Option High Speed Mobile driver -> UAF if unplug device before fully registered - local attacker could trigger - crash / code-exec

[USN-5164-1] Linux kernel vulnerabilities [04:50]

  • 3 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS)
  • 4.15 (bionic, xenial ESM, trusty ESM - azure)
  • AMD cryptographic coprocessor driver memory leaks -> DoS (Episode 138)
  • SCTP OOB read - incoming packets

[USN-5165-1] Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities [05:13]

[USN-5168-1, USN-5168-2, USN-5168-3] NSS and Thunderbird vulnerability [06:08]

  • 1 CVEs addressed in Trusty ESM (14.04 ESM), Xenial ESM (16.04 ESM), Bionic (18.04 LTS), Focal (20.04 LTS), Hirsute (21.04), Impish (21.10)

New NSS vulnerability (CVE-2021-43527) discussion [06:17]

  • Discovered by Tavis Ormandy at GPZ
  • NSS is a very old project, code in question has existed since 2003 and been exploitable since at least 2012 when it was refactored
  • Does a direct memcpy of an attacker controlled amount of data into a fixed size buffer without specifically checking whether the data is too large - classic heap-based buffer overflow
  • Object on the heap also contains function pointer which then get called so relatively easy to get control flow and code execution as a result
  • NSS was one of the first projects added to oss-fuzz (Google), Mozilla do own fuzzing as well, extensive testsuite and uses ASAN for internal builds
  • Uses Coverity but this didn’t detect it either
  • Existing fuzzing and unit tests had test cases which could reach this code but failed to find it for a number of reasons:
    • Fuzz input is limited to 10k - but to overflow need at least 16,384 bytes so fuzzing couldn’t have caught this
    • Individual code paths fuzzed but not so much end-to-end systematic testing - so nothing which would try generating say large inputs in this case - does occur for other code-paths though
    • Existing metrics almalgate results from all fuzzers - so hard to tell how well a piece of code has been fuzzed as it may have been using a fuzzed which may never trigger relevant input to find bugs like this
  • Seemingly well tested, well fuzzed code is not enough - need to look systematically and quantify how complete the coverage is not just in terms of LOC or inputs used, but also boundary conditions etc
  • https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/12/this-shouldnt-have-happened.html

Get in contact

  continue reading

231 에피소드

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