Artwork

The New Statesman에서 제공하는 콘텐츠입니다. 에피소드, 그래픽, 팟캐스트 설명을 포함한 모든 팟캐스트 콘텐츠는 The New Statesman 또는 해당 팟캐스트 플랫폼 파트너가 직접 업로드하고 제공합니다. 누군가가 귀하의 허락 없이 귀하의 저작물을 사용하고 있다고 생각되는 경우 여기에 설명된 절차를 따르실 수 있습니다 https://ko.player.fm/legal.
Player FM -팟 캐스트 앱
Player FM 앱으로 오프라인으로 전환하세요!

What we learned from the Wagner mutiny

16:17
 
공유
 

Manage episode 367573044 series 3339421
The New Statesman에서 제공하는 콘텐츠입니다. 에피소드, 그래픽, 팟캐스트 설명을 포함한 모든 팟캐스트 콘텐츠는 The New Statesman 또는 해당 팟캐스트 플랫폼 파트너가 직접 업로드하고 제공합니다. 누군가가 귀하의 허락 없이 귀하의 저작물을 사용하고 있다고 생각되는 경우 여기에 설명된 절차를 따르실 수 있습니다 https://ko.player.fm/legal.

On June 23 the New Statesman’s contributing writer Bruno Macaes visited Ukraine’s head of military intelligence Kyrylo Budanov in Kyiv. They discussed the progress of the war, Russian propaganda (Budanov had been declared dead or dying), the 2022 Nord Stream attack and Russian plans for an attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Just three hours later, Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that his private military, the Wagner Group, would march on Russian army headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, as a punishment for its poor leadership. Shortly after midnight on 24 June, Prigozhin’s mutiny entered Russia and began marching on Moscow. By the end of the day, he had called it off.


Why did Prigozhin do it – and why did he stop? Was Putin’s authority terminally damaged? In this on-the-ground dispatch, Macaes looks at the roots of the mutiny, as well as what it reveals about the weaknesses of the Russian state: “It should,” he writes, “be regarded as a laboratory test for understanding Putin and his regime, and inform Western actions for what remains of the war in Ukraine.”

Written by Bruno Macaes and read by Will Lloyd.

This article originally appeared in the 30 June-6 July issue of the New Statesman. You can read the text version here.

If you enjoyed listening to this episode, you might also like What drives Emmanuel Macron? By Jeremy Cliffe



Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

  continue reading

88 에피소드

Artwork
icon공유
 
Manage episode 367573044 series 3339421
The New Statesman에서 제공하는 콘텐츠입니다. 에피소드, 그래픽, 팟캐스트 설명을 포함한 모든 팟캐스트 콘텐츠는 The New Statesman 또는 해당 팟캐스트 플랫폼 파트너가 직접 업로드하고 제공합니다. 누군가가 귀하의 허락 없이 귀하의 저작물을 사용하고 있다고 생각되는 경우 여기에 설명된 절차를 따르실 수 있습니다 https://ko.player.fm/legal.

On June 23 the New Statesman’s contributing writer Bruno Macaes visited Ukraine’s head of military intelligence Kyrylo Budanov in Kyiv. They discussed the progress of the war, Russian propaganda (Budanov had been declared dead or dying), the 2022 Nord Stream attack and Russian plans for an attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Just three hours later, Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that his private military, the Wagner Group, would march on Russian army headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, as a punishment for its poor leadership. Shortly after midnight on 24 June, Prigozhin’s mutiny entered Russia and began marching on Moscow. By the end of the day, he had called it off.


Why did Prigozhin do it – and why did he stop? Was Putin’s authority terminally damaged? In this on-the-ground dispatch, Macaes looks at the roots of the mutiny, as well as what it reveals about the weaknesses of the Russian state: “It should,” he writes, “be regarded as a laboratory test for understanding Putin and his regime, and inform Western actions for what remains of the war in Ukraine.”

Written by Bruno Macaes and read by Will Lloyd.

This article originally appeared in the 30 June-6 July issue of the New Statesman. You can read the text version here.

If you enjoyed listening to this episode, you might also like What drives Emmanuel Macron? By Jeremy Cliffe



Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

  continue reading

88 에피소드

모든 에피소드

×
 
Loading …

플레이어 FM에 오신것을 환영합니다!

플레이어 FM은 웹에서 고품질 팟캐스트를 검색하여 지금 바로 즐길 수 있도록 합니다. 최고의 팟캐스트 앱이며 Android, iPhone 및 웹에서도 작동합니다. 장치 간 구독 동기화를 위해 가입하세요.

 

빠른 참조 가이드

탐색하는 동안 이 프로그램을 들어보세요.
재생